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ABSTRACT
This study analyses the effect of firm characteristics and governance
mechanisms on cash holdings for a sample of UK SMEs. The results show that
UK SMEs with greater cash flow volatility, and institutional investors hold more
cash; whereas levered and dividend paying SMEs with non-executive ownership
hold less cash. We also find that ownership structure is significant only in
explaining the cash holdings for firms with high growth investment opportunities,
and leverage is only significant in explaining the cash held by firms with low
growth investment opportunities. Our findings suggest that internal governance
mechanisms are more effective for SMEs with high growth investment
opportunities, while external governance mechanisms, such as capital market
monitoring, are more effective for firms with low growth investment
opportunities.
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31. INTRODUCTION
During the period of 1984 to 1999, UK firms had about 10% of their total
assets invested in cash and cash equivalents (Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004). This
proportion indicates that investments in cash are considerable for UK firms.
Investment in cash, however, is subjected to an opportunity cost. This opportunity
cost is characterised by the low rate of return earned on highly liquid assets. The
question of why firms hold cash has attracted a number of researchers (see for
example, Kim, Mauer and Sherman, 1998; Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and
Williamson, 1999; Ferreira and Vilela, 2004; Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004; Harford,
Mansi and Maxwell, 2008). Perhaps two of the most notable features of these
studies are the absence of consistent evidence on the hypothesised determinants of
cash holdings and the lack of focus on the small medium-sized firms (SMEs)1.
In this paper we investigate the cash holdings of UK SMEs. We focus on
SMEs as the previous studies on the determinants of cash holdings concentrated
on large firms. The lack of attention to SMEs is somehow surprising given that
they are the backbone of the UK economy2 and are often characterized as high
risk firms. Market imperfections such as informational asymmetry and financial
distress are documented as being more serious for SMEs. For instance, Titman
and Wessels (1988) highlight that SMEs are likely to suffer from financial
1 A notable exception for the focus on SMEs is the study by Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solano
(2008) who investigate the effect of firm financial characteristics on cash holdings for a Spanish
sample.
2 According to von Kalckreuth and Murphy (2005) small and medium firms represent around 54%
of the gross value added in the UK economy, 56% of employment and 52% of turnover.
4distress. Similarly, Whited (1992), and Fazzari and Peterson (1993) argue that
small firms are more likely to be affected by financial constraints (due to limited
internal finance and costly external finance) compared to large firms. In addition,
transaction costs for small firms are expected to be high (Mulligan, 1997). With
respect to ownership structure, Faulkender (2002) argues that the ownership of
SMEs is more varied as opposed to large firms, which provides a better platform
from which to examine the agency cost elements associated with cash holdings.
Finally, in the wake of the 2007 financial crisis that led to stringent credit
conditions, studying the cash holdings behaviour of SMEs is far more important
today than ever before.
The extent to which managers actually have the ability to implement
decisions that increase or decrease firm cash holdings depends on a firm’s
governance structure. The current study incorporates an extensive range of firm-
level attributes for internal governance mechanisms. These governance attributes
include board size, non-executives representation on the board, executives and
non-executives ownership, and leadership structure. Another important feature of
this paper is that we contend that SMEs cash holdings and the effectiveness of
governance mechanisms depend on the firm’s investment opportunities. It is
generally held that firms with high growth investment opportunities face greater
information asymmetry and agency costs (Smith and Watts, 1992). If this is the
case one would expect internal governance mechanisms to play a significant role
in high growth but not necessarily low growth firms.
To carry out the empirical analysis, the study employs a sample of 368 UK
SMEs for the period 2005 to 2008. The results show that non-executive ownership
5is negatively related to cash holdings. This result suggests that the non-executives
ownership is the most effective internal monitoring mechanism. Interestingly,
institutional ownership is positively related to cash holdings. This result highlights
the passive nature of UK institutional investors (Faccio and Lasfer, 2000; Franks,
Mayer, and Reeneboog, 2001; Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004) which makes them
ineffective monitors of cash holding decisions. Therefore, in their presence
entrenched management can easily accumulate large cash reserves with minimal
fear of discharge or discipline. As expected, the results also show that governance
mechanisms are not as effective for firms with low growth investment
opportunities compared to firms with high growth investment opportunities.
The rest of this study is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses how the
existing cash holdings theories can be used to explain the financing decisions for
SMEs, and presents the empirical hypotheses. Section 3 provides a description of
the sample utilized in the current study. Section 4 presents the empirical results.
Section 5 concludes.
2. Theoretical Foundations and Empirical Hypothesis
In their seminal papers Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963) argue that in
the presence of perfect capital markets any financial decision made by a firm,
such as cash holdings, will have a net present value (NPV) of zero. The literature
on the determinants of cash holding has utilized the relaxation of the Modigliani-
Miller condition of perfect capital markets. This allows characteristics such as
bankruptcy cost, capital market frictions, agency conflicts and taxation to play a
6greater role in understanding cash holdings. Ultimately, this has resulted in
theoretical frameworks which have their antecedent in capital structure to explain
the determinants of corporate cash holdings, namely: the Trade-Off Theory, the
Pecking Order Theory and Free Cash Flow hypothesis.
The Trade-Off Theory
The premise of the Trade-Off Theory is that firms set their optimal cash
holdings by considering the tradeoff between the marginal benefits and costs of
cash holdings (Kim, Mauer and Sherman, 1998; Opler et al., 1999). The marginal
benefits are: reduction of the likelihood of financial distress, allowance for the
pursuance of investment policy when financial constraints are met and the
minimization of the cost of raising external funds or liquidating assets. Similarly,
the marginal costs of holding cash are the low rate of return on these assets and
possible tax disadvantages. In this context, the Trade-Off Theory implies the
existence of an optimal level of cash holdings.
The Pecking Order Theory
The Pecking Order Theory state that to reduce asymmetric information
costs and financing costs, firms should first finance their investments with
retained earnings (cash), then with debt and finally with equity (Myers, 1984).
Furthermore, Opler et al. (1999) argue that the Pecking Order Theory implies the
absence of an optimal level for cash holdings. As such, cash holding levels
fluctuate on the basis of a firm’s fortune. Opler et al. (1999) also highlight that the
7empirical implications of the determinants of corporate cash holdings with respect
to the Trade-Off Theory and the Pecking Order Theory are not always easily
differentiable when the cost of external capital is allowed to play a greater role as
the Trade-Off Theory and the Pecking Order Theory have similar empirical
implications for specific firm characteristics.
The Free Cash Flow Hypothesis
A critical assumption of the Trade-Off Theory and Pecking Order Theory
is that management always acts in the interest of shareholders, in other words,
there is an implicit absence of agency conflicts between shareholders and
managers. Jensen (1986) highlights that in the presence of large free cash flows
the agency problem between shareholders and managers can be severe. Opler et
al. (1999) argue that in the presence of agency problems associated with
managerial discretion, management may pursue self interests at the expense of
shareholders with cash serving as a catalyst. They argued that management may
hold excessive cash reserves because they wish to reduce their personal
undiversified risk and pursue their own objectives. Opler et al. (1999), and Ozkan
and Ozkan (2004) argue that the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis highlights the
determinants which provide an incentive for the accumulation of large cash
reserves which might not be consistent with firm value maximization.
82.1 The Determinants of Cash Holdings
This section elaborates on the firm characteristics which are prominent in
the literature as the determinants of cash holdings. Importantly, Ferreira and
Vilela (2004) highlight that firm characteristics influence cash holding decisions
in different ways in the three theories under consideration.
Firm Size
Since small firms are described as suffering from severe exposure to
informational asymmetries (Berger and Udell, 1998). It is this exposure which
Kim, Mauer and Sherman. (1998) highlight as a factor which contributes to small
firms facing more borrowing constraints and high costs of external financing.
Furthermore, small firms are likely to experience financial distress (Titman and
Wessels, 1988). Therefore, firm size is expected to be inversely related to the
amount of cash a firm holds, consistent with the Trade-Off Theory. However, the
Pecking Order Theory presumes that firm size provides an indication of success.
Therefore, in the Pecking Order world a positive relationship between firm size
and cash holdings is expected (Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). Finally, the Free Cash
Flow Hypothesis suggests that large firms have greater shareholder dispersion,
resulting in greater levels of managerial discretion over cash holding decisions
(Ferreira and Vilela, 2004). Therefore, where managers of large firms have more
discretionary power over investment and financial policy, a greater level of cash
holding may be evident; this would imply a positive relationship between cash
holdings and firm size.
9Hypothesis 1: There is an ambiguous relationship between firm size and
cash holdings.
Leverage
Ferreira and Vilela (2004) argue that in the Pecking Order world, debt
grows when investment needs exceed the amount of internal resources available
and falls when investment needs are less than the internal resources. Within the
framework of the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis, Ferreira and Vilela (2204) contend
that debt serves as a monitoring mechanism to ensure that managerial decisions
are in line with shareholder wealth maximization. Therefore, low levels of debt
would provide little monitoring and offer incentives for management to engage in
the accumulation of large cash reserves. Thus, the Pecking Order theory and the
Free Cash Flow Hypothesis imply an inverse relationship between leverage and
cash holdings. However, Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) argue that firms with high
levels of leverage have high probability of financial distress, suggesting a positive
relationship may exist between leverage and cash holdings. As such, the
relationship between cash holdings and leverage is potentially ambiguous.
Hypothesis 2: There is an ambiguous relationship between leverage and cash
holdings.
Non-Cash Liquid Substitutes
Opler et al. (1999) and Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) argue that in context of
the Trade-Off Theory it is plausible to believe that the cost associated with
converting non-cash liquid assets into cash is less, relative to other asset classes.
As such, in the event of a cash shortfall, the presence of substantial non-cash
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liquid assets provides firms with an internal resource, making it unnecessary to fill
shortfalls with trips to the capital markets. Therefore, firms with more non-cash
liquid asset would be expected to hold less cash.
Hypothesis 3: There is a negative relationship between non-cash liquid assets and
cash holdings.
Cash Flow Volatility
Opler et al. (1999) argue that firms with greater cash flow volatility are
likely to enter in situations where there is a shortfall in internal resources.
Additionally, such a shortfall can incur substantial costs if it results in the
abandonment of positive NPV projects. Moreover, Minton and Schrand (1999)
argue that firms with a high frequency of cash shortfalls find the external sources
of finance expensive. Consistent with the Trade-Off Theory, firms with a greater
degree of cash flow volatility will hold greater amounts of cash to lower the
expected cost of liquidity constraints (Kim et al. 1998; Opler et al., 1999; Ozkan
and Ozkan, 2004).
Hypothesis 4: There is a positive relationship between cash flow volatility and
cash holdings.
Dividends
Within the Trade-Off Theory realm, the relationship between dividends
and cash holdings is expected to be negative. For example, Ferreira and Viela
(2004) argue that firms with a reputation for paying dividends can raise funds at
lower cost (by cutting dividends) as opposed to those not paying dividends.
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Therefore, the relationship between cash holdings and dividends is expected to be
negative.
Hypothesis 5: There is a negative relationship between dividend paying firms and
cash holding.
2.2 Governance Mechanisms and Cash Holdings
To minimize the agency costs stemming from the separation of ownership
and control, a number of governance mechanisms have been put forward (Jensen
and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983). Ultimately, the
purpose of these mechanisms is to align the interest of managers and shareholders.
Board Size
There is no clear consensus in the literature about whether the size of the
board of directors matters when it comes to monitoring managers and limits their
opportunistic behaviour. For instance, Jensen (1993) argues that large boards tend
to be less effective as the involvement of more individuals in the decision making
process slows agreements. Yermack’s (1996) study lends support to the premise
that small boards are more effective than large ones. On the other hand, Lehn,
Sukesh and Zhao (2003) contend that monitoring is more efficient with a large
board because of greater shared information. In the same vein, Raheja (2005)
argues that, as the benefits of monitoring increase, boards will do more
monitoring leading to large boards. Dalton, Daily, Johnson and Ellstrand (1999)
document a positive relationship between board size and firm performance.
Therefore, the relationship between board size and cash holdings is expected to be
ambiguous.
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Hypothesis 6: There is an ambiguous relationship between board size and cash
holdings
Non-Executive Representation
Weir, Laing and McKnight (2002) highlight that the composition of the
board of directors is an important mechanism as the presence of non-executive
directors serve as a mechanism to monitor and ensure the interest of executive
directors and shareholders are aligned. Furthermore, they argue that this is
attributable to the independence of non-executive directors and the incentive for
non-executive directors to maintain a good reputation. Additionally, the fear of
lawsuits and the market for their services provide further motivation for non-
executives to be efficient monitors of board decisions (Fama and Jensen, 1983;
Kaplan and Reishus, 1990; McKnight and Weir, 2009). Weir, Laing and
McKnight present a positive relationship between non-executives presence and
firm performance for a UK sample. Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) argue that there is a
greater expectation for firms with more non-executives directorship representation
to make better decisions.
Hypothesis 7: There is a negative relationship between non-executive
representation and cash holdings.
Executive Ownership and Non-Executive Ownership
Within the paradigm of the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis, a possible
solution to mitigating the problems associated with managerial opportunism is to
increase managerial equity ownership (Jensen, 1993), as this strengthens the
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alignment of shareholders’ and management’s interest. Therefore, if large cash
holdings are detrimental to firm value, management would be discouraged in
hoarding cash due to their greater interest in maximizing firm value. In this
context, the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis indicates a strict monotonic negative
relationship between managerial ownership and cash holdings. However, other
studies highlight that the relationship between managerial ownership and cash
holdings is not monotonic (see for example, Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1988;
McConnell, Servaes and Lins, 2004). In these studies, it is argued that high levels
of managerial ownership lead to entrenchment (for example, by over-investing
and accepting negative NPV projects that reduce corporate wealth). Unlike prior
studies, the current study controls for both executives and non-executives
ownership. Considering that non-executives have sufficient incentives for their
interest to be aligned with that of shareholders, non-executive ownership should
reduce agency problems and result in a reduction in large cash reserves, strictly
consistent with the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis. However, executive ownership
may follow a non-linear relationship with large cash holdings.
Hypothesis 8: There is a non-linear relationship between executive ownership
and cash holdings.
Hypothesis 9: There is a negative relationship between non-executive ownership
and cash holdings.
Institutional Ownership
Institutional ownership serves as an external mechanism to further monitor
the activities of a firm’s management to ensure pursuance of firm value
maximization. Pound (1988) argues that institutional investors have resources and
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expertise in monitoring and evaluating the performance of management at low
costs. Similarly, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) suggest that institutional holders
mitigate the free-rider problem, perform monitoring functions, and reduce the
scope for managerial opportunism. Consequently, Admati, Pfleiderer, and
Zechner (1994) argue that institutional investors can reduce the free cash flow in
management hands through their active monitoring role. Therefore, firms with
high level of institutional owners are expected to hold less cash.
Hypothesis 10: There is a negative relationship with institutional ownership and
cash holdings.
Non-Executive Chairman
One of the recommendations of the UK Corporate Governance Code is
that the roles of chairman and chief executive should be held by different
individuals (see Weir, Laing and McKnight, 2002).3 Furthermore, the Code
recommends that the chairman be a non-executive director. In the same vein,
OECD principles of corporate governance (2004, p. 39) asserts that “separation of
the two posts may be regarded as a good practice as it can help to achieve an
appropriate balance of power, increase accountability and improve the board’s
capacity for decision making independent of management”. As such, we contend
that there should be a a negative relationship between the presence of a non-
executive chairman and excess cash holdings, consistent with the Free Cash Flow
Hypothesis.
Hypothesis 11: There is a negative relationship between the presence of a non-
executive chairman and cash holdings.
3Hereafter referred to as the Code.
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3. SAMPLE SELECTION AND DESCRIPTIVES
There is no generally accepted definition of SMEs, but a quantitative
definition, which employs total assets, annual turnover and number of employees
of the firm, is commonly employed in the literature (see for example, Sogorb-
Mira, 2005; Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solano, 2008; Psillaki and Daskalakis,
2009). The sample of SMEs considered in this study is extracted from all non
financial listed firms in the UK for the period of 2005-2008. More specifically, in
each year firms that meet the following criteria are considered as SMEs: (1) total
assets less than or equal to £11.4 million; (2) annual turnover less than or equal to
£22.8 million; (3) total number of employees less than or equal to 2504.
To carry out the empirical analysis, we hand collected the governance and
ownership structure information for each firm and for each year from the Capital
Ideas Corporate Register5. In particular, we collected the following information:
the number of directors on a firm’s board, the number of non-executive directors
on the firm’s board, the percentage ownership of the largest institutional
shareholder, the presence of a non-executive chairman, the number of ordinary
shares held by each executive director, the number of ordinary shares held by each
non-executive. Data on firm financial characteristics is obtained from DataStream.
After excluding firms without the requisite information for the empirical analysis,
this yields a sample of 368 listed SMEs for the period 2005 to 2008. For
convenience, data source and empirical definitions of all variables are presented in
table 1.
4 This definition of SMEs is taken from the UK’s Company Act (2006).
5 The Capital Ideas Corporate Register was formerly published as the Price Waterhouse Coopers
Corporate Register.
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The sample means and medians are presented in table 2. The mean cash
ratio (CASH) for the whole sample is 24.90%, with a median value of 17.97%.
With comparison to Ozkan and Ozkan’s (2004) study, which examines cash
holdings for large UK non financial firms, this study shows that SMEs hold high
levels of cash. The average (median) board size (BSIZE) is 5.40 (5.44).
Executives own, on average, 23% of the firms’ shares, with a median of 11%;
whereas non-executive directors own, on average (median), 7% (2.4%) of the
firms’ shares. 66.49%, on average, of UK SMEs have a non-executive as a
chairman (NCH). This result suggests that the majority of SMEs appointed a non-
executive as a chairman and this is consistent with the recommendations by the
Code. The Pearson’s pair-wise correlation matrix, in table 3, shows that the
maximum absolute correlation coefficient amongst the set of variables is between
cash volatility (CVOL) and leverage (LEV), with an absolute value of 0.513.
Furthermore, the correlation between QRATIO and MCTA is significantly
positive with a value of 0.98 suggesting that the two variables are strong proxies
for the investment opportunity set (IOS).
4. EMPRICAL RESULTS
To examine the determinants of cash holdings for UK SMEs, multivariate
regressions are utilized. One possible salient issue with the analysis is that the
relationship between cash holdings and its hypothesized determinants are
endogenous. To control for the existence of this endogeneity problem, we employ
the methodology of Rajan and Zingales (1995), where the dependent variable is
measured in year 2008, while for the independent variables the average values
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over the period 2005-2007 are utilized6. In order to provide a comprehensive
analysis of the determinant of cash holdings, we consider three different models.
Model 1 includes only firm financial characteristics to facilitate comparison with
earlier studies. Models 2 and 3 provide a more complete framework on the
relationship between the different governance mechanisms, firm financial
characteristics and cash holdings. The results on the determinants of UK SME
cash holdings are documented in table 4.
The coefficient of cash volatility (CVOL) is positive and significant in all
models. This result is consistent with the Trade-Off Theory, which suggests that
firms with a greater degree of cash flow volatility need to hold more cash in order
to lower the expected cost of liquidity constraints. Leverage (LEV) has a
significant negative effect on cash holdings. This finding is also reported by
Baskin (1987), Kim et al. (1998), and Opler et al. (1999). According to Trade-Off
Theory, leverage is considered as an index of a firm’s ability to generate external
funds, suggesting that a levered firm does not need to hold cash. Another
plausible explanation is that debt can be used as a substitute for cash holdings.
There is also some evidence, in models 1 and 2, that dividend payments affect
negatively cash holdings. This result is consistent with the Trade-Off Theory,
which suggests that dividend paying SMEs cut dividends in the event of a
shortfall in cash reserves. Therefore, in the presence of expensive external funds
SMEs can cut dividends in order to have available liquid resources implying a
6 Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) employ a similar methodology to examine the determinants of cash
holdings.
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transaction motive. Regarding governance mechanisms, non-executive ownership
(NEXO) is negatively related to cash holdings at the 10% level. This result
suggests that providing non-executive directors with ownership creates an
additional incentive to reduce the cash in management hands. Additionally, model
3 provides evidence of low levels of executives’ ownership (EXO) minimize cash
holdings. This result supports the strict negative relationship predicted by the Free
Cash Flow Hypothesis, as there is no significant evidence of a non-monotonic
relationship between executive ownership (EXOSQ) and cash holdings in model
3. Contrary to our expectation, institutional ownership (INST) is positive and
significant. This result could be associated to the fact that institutional investors
are poor monitors of firm financial decisions in the UK. This result is consistent
with the view advanced by Ozkan and Ozkan (2004, p. 2114), which suggests that
UK institutional owners adopt a passive attitude towards monitoring and
disciplining firms’ management.
Firm opportunity set and cash holdings
To assess the effect of a firm investment opportunity set on cash holdings,
the sample of 368 SMEs is split into three sub-samples,based on the following
two proxies for the investment growth opportunities: the Tobin’s Q (Q-Ratio) and
the ratio of market capitalisation to total assets (MCTA). The sample is split as
follows: firms with investment opportunity values below the 40th percentile are
considered as low growth investment SMEs, firms with investment opportunity
values above the 60th percentile are considered as high growth investment firms.
The means and the medians of these two sub-samples are presented in table 2. On
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average, high growth investment SMEs hold larger amounts of cash, are smaller
in size, are subjected to greater levels of cash flow volatility, pay less dividends,
have low levels of debts and hold smaller amounts of non-liquid cash substitutes,
compared to low growth investment SMEs. The difference in means between the
two sets is significant at the 1% level.
The regression analysis results are reported in table 5. The sample in
models 1 to 4 is split on the basis of Q-Ratio, while in models 5 to 8 the sample is
split on the basis of the ratio of market capitalisation to total assets. Non-executive
ownership (NEXO) is negative and significant at the 5% level, for firms with high
growth opportunities (models 3, 4, 7 and 8). There is also some evidence that the
relationship between executives’ ownership (EXO) and cash holdings is
monotonic and negative for high growth firms (models 3 and 7). This finding
suggests that ownership structure plays an important role in mitigating agency
conflicts stemming from the cash held for investments. The results also show a
significant positive relationship between institutional ownership (INST) and cash
holdings, irrespective of the investment opportunity set. This result supports the
existing evidence that UK institutional investors are passive and inactive monitors
(Faccio and Lasfer, 2000; Franks et al., 2001; Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004).
Therefore, in the presence of institutional ownership, ceteris paribus, management
may engage in hoarding cash for self-interest, with minimal fear of discharge.
Interestingly, results in table 5 show that none of the board structure measures
(BSIZE, NEXR and NCH) is significant. This suggests that these mechanisms are
ineffective in mitigating potential free cash flow problems in UK SMEs.
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With respect to firm characteristics, leverage (LEV) is negative and
significant at the 5% level for firms with low growth investment opportunities,
suggesting that these firms are exposed to capital market monitoring. Leverage,
however, does not affect the cash held by high growth investment firms. This
finding is consistent with the argument that high growth investment firms are
more prone to informational asymmetries (compared to low growth investment
firms) which makes external financing such as debt expensive (Myers, 1984;
Hutchinson and Gul, 2004). Therefore, if low growth investment SMEs are
subjected to lower informational asymmetries, then leverage might provide a
cheaper mechanism with which to monitor management. Finally, the results
indicate that the cash flow volatility (CVOL) affects positively the cash held by
low growth investment firms.
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Most of the current understanding of what determines firm cash holdings
comes from studies that focused on large firms. Given the importance of cash for
SMEs and their role in the UK economy, this paper examines the effect of
governance mechanisms and firm characteristics on cash holdings for a sample of
368 UK SMEs. Overall, the evidence suggests that UK SMEs hold cash mainly
for transaction costs and precautionary motives.
The empirical analysis shows that UK SMEs with greater cash flow
volatility and institutional investors hold more cash. Conversely, levered and
dividend paying SMEs with non-executives ownership hold less cash.
Interestingly, when we distinguish between firms with high growth investment
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opportunities and firms with low growth investment opportunities, the results
show that ownership structure is significant only in explaining the cash holdings
for firms with high growth investment opportunities; while leverage is only
significant in explaining the cash held by firms with low growth investment
opportunities. This implies that internal governance mechanisms are more
effective for firms with high growth SMEs, whereas external governance
mechanisms, such as capital market monitoring, are more effective for firms with
low growth investment opportunities. Finally, the lack of support for the
hypothesis that the board structure affects cash holdings may be attributed to the
UK being characterised as having strong levels of investor protection (Dittmar,
Mahrt-Smith and Servaes, 2003). Shareholder might have sufficient legal
protection to inhibit management from pursuing self-interests. Therefore, publicly
traded UK SMEs might hold large cash reserves and not necessarily incur severe
agency costs.
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Table 1: Variable Definition
VARIABLE PROXY EMPIRICAL DEFINITION SOURCE
CASH Cash Holdings Cash and Cash Equivalents/ Total
Assets
DataStream
SIZE Firm Size Natural logarithm of Total Assets DataStream
LEV Leverage Total Debt/Total Assets DataStream
CSUB Non-Cash Liquid
Substitutes
(Current Assets - Cash and Cash
Equivalents - Current Liabilities) /
Total Assets
DataStream
CVOL Cash Flow Volatility Standard Deviation of the past 5
years of: Funds from Operations /
Total Assets
DataStream
DIVD Dividend Paying Firms Firms that have a non-zero
Dividend per Share for the year
takes a value of 1, otherwise 0
DataStream
BSIZE Board Size The natural logarithm of total
directors on the board of directors
Corporate Register,
NEXR Non-executive
Representation
Number of non-executive directors
/ total directors on board
Corporate Register
EXO Executive Ownership The number of shares held by
executive directors / Number of
Outstanding Shares
Corporate Register,
DataStream
EXOSQ Executive Ownership
Squared
EXO2
NEXO Non-executive
Ownership
The number of shares held by non-
executive directors / Number of
Ordinary Shares
Corporate Register,
DataStream
INST Institutional Ownership Max (Percentage Ownership among
the set of institutional owners)
Corporate Register,
FAME
NCH Non-Executive
Chairman Presence
This variable is set to 1 if a firm has
a non-executive chairman,
otherwise 0.
Corporate Register
QRATIO Investment Opportunity
Set
(Market Capitalisation + Total
Debt) / Total Assets
DataStream
MCTA Investment Opportunity
Set
Market Capitalisation / Total Assets DataStream
23
Table 2 Descriptive statistics
Variables All
Sample
Low IOS
(Q-ratio)
High IOS
(Q-ratio)
T-diff. Low IOS
(MCTA)
High IOS
(MCTA)
T-diff.
CASH 0.249
(0.179)
0.193
(0.112)
0.324
(0.284)
4.81a 0.177
(0.108)
0.328
(0.284)
5.66a
SIZE 8.799
(8.856)
9.059
(9.132)
8.541
(8.565)
-4.52a 9.058
(9.154)
8.542
(8.589)
-4.51a
LEV 0.111
(0.042)
0.115
(0.072)
0.101
(0.024)
-0.81 0.1477
(0.099)
0.098
(0.021)
-2.32 b
CSUB -0.021
(-0.008)
0.022
(0.024)
-0.057
(-0.028)
-3.08a 0.013
(0.015)
-0.060
(-0.028)
-2.78 a
CVOL 0.130
(0.084)
0.100
(0.071)
0.1773
(0.106)
4.36a 0.1035
(0.073)
0.177
( 0.106)
4.20a
DIVD 0.229
(0)
0.324
(0)
0.155
(0)
-3.45a 0.331
(0)
0.162
(0)
-3.42a
BSIZE 5.403
(5.33)
5.274
(5.010)
5.653
(5.658)
2.46b 5.253
(5.002)
5.633
(5.655)
2.43 b
NEXR 0.481
(0.500)
0.451
(0.450)
0.494
(0.500)
2.52 b 0.4540
(0.4512)
0.492
(0.500)
2.20b
EXO 0.230
(0.110)
0.227
(0.117)
0.274
(0.120)
0.55 0.222
(0.123)
0.274
(0.120)
0.60
NEXO 0.074
(0.024)
0.066
(0.028)
0.088
(0.022)
1.15 0.0736
(0.033)
0.091
(0.023)
0.91
INST 0.097
(0.091)
0.098
(0.094)
0.095
(0.083)
-0.38 0.096
(0.094)
0.094
(0.083)
-0.18
NCH 0.664
(1)
0.589
(1)
0.746
(1)
2.88 a 0.589
(1)
0.746
(1)
2.88 a
This table shows the sample means and medians for 368 SMEs. Figures between brackets are
medians. T-diff is the static for difference in means between small and large IOS firms. a, b and c
indicate the coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. For definition of variables see
table 1.
24
Table 3: Spearman Correlation Coefficients
1 2 3 4 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1.CASH 1
2.SIZE -0.16a 1
3.LEV -0.38a -0.01 1
4.CSUB 0.02 0.12b -0.20a 1
5.CVOL 0.23a -0.51a 0.07 -0.15a 1
6.DIVD -0.17a 0.26a 0.04 0.20a -0.22a 1
7.QRATIO 0.33a -0.26a -0.12b -0.19a 0.28a -0.19a 1
8.MCTA 0.36a -0.26a -0.21a -0.15a 0.26a -0.19a 0.98a 1
9.BSIZE 0.06 -0.16a -0.006 -0.06 0.23a -0.16a 0.28a 0.30a 1
10.NEXR 0.06 0.08 -0.07 -0.008 -0.02 -0.22a 0.08 0.08c 0.09c 1
11.EXO -0.02 -0.01 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.007 0.004 0.04 -0.13b 1
12.NEXO -0.08c 0.07 0.001 0.09c -0.05 0.01 -0.08c -0.08 0.02 0.11b 0.07 1
13.INST 0.10b 0.15a -0.07 0.05 -0.04 -0.15a 0.003 -0.006 0.01 0.12b 0.001 0.05 1
14.NCH 0.10c 0.02 -0.08 0.09c 0.08 0.005 0.12b 0.13b 0.15a 0.29a -0.08 0.09c 0.128b 1
For definition of variables see table 1. a, b and c indicate the coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
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Table 4: Cross sectional regressions explaining cash holdings.
Predicted Sign (1) (2) (3)
Coeff. P. value Coeff. P. value Coeff. P. value
SIZE ? -0.021 (0.13) -0.023 (0.12) -0.023 (0.11)
CVOL + 0.222a 0.010) 0.219a (0.01) 0.224a (0.01)
LEV ? -0.316a (0.00) -0.326a (0.00) -0.330a (0.00)
CSUB - -0.046 (0.42) -0.058 (0.31) -0.058 (0.30)
DIVD - -0.053b (0.05) -0.047c (0.10) -0.044 (0.12)
BSIZE ? -0.038 (0.43) -0.038 (0.43)
NEXR - -0.022 (0.78) -0.023 (0.77)
EXO - -0.014 (0.33) -0.066c (0.09)
EXOSQ + 0.008 (0.12)
NEXO - -0.111c (0.09) -0.107c (0.09)
INST - 0.444b (0.01) 0.434b (0.01)
NCH - 0.030 (0.27) 0.028 (0.30)
N 368 363 363
F-Test 5.90a 4.60a 4.62a
R2 0.15 0.17 0.17
All models include a constant and industry dummies. P-values are robust to heteroscedasticity and are reported
in parenthesis. Table 1 provides definition for all variables. a, b and c indicate the coefficient is significant at
1%, 5% and 10% respectively
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Table 5: IOS and Cash Holdings
Low IOS (Q-ratio) High IOS (Q-ratio) Low IOS (MCTA) High IOS (MCTA)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
SIZE -0.035 -0.034 0.006 0.005 -0.041c -0.041c 0.010 0.008
(0.19) (0.203) (0.803) (0.844) (0.090) (0.090) (0.709) (0.757)
LEV -0.392a -0.395a -0.253 -0.255 -0.277a -0.281a -0.240 -0.242
(0.00) (0.009) (0.333) (0.327) (0.005) (0.003) (0.359) (0.353)
CSUB -0.063 -0.064 -0.053 -0.048 0.009 0.006 -.043 -0.037
(0.56) (0.558) (0.496) (0.543) (0.926) (0.951) (0.606) (0.660)
CVOL 0.539b 0.5393b 0.041 0.042 0.508b 0.512b 0.028 0.029
(0.022) (0.022) (0.708) (0.699) (0.018) (0.017) (0.799) (0.788)
DIVD -0.0005 -0.0008 -0.071 -0.071 -0.012 -0.010 -0.091 -0.090
(0.99) (0.983) (0.242) (0.242) (0.736) (0.775) (0.139) (0.142)
BSIZE -0.069 -0.069 -0.054 -0.047 -0.064 -0.064 -0.076 -0.067
(0.342) (0.344) (0.561) (0.619) (0.347) (0.340) (0.424) (0.487)
NEXR 0.018 0.019 0.047 0.040 0.002 -0.0008 0.090 0.082
(0.86) (0.859) (0.764) (0.798) (0.979) (0.994) (0.582) (0.618)
EXO 0.014 0.023 -0.036c -0.129 0.011 -0.018 -0.037c -0.146
(0.157) (0.695) (0.085) (0.239) (0.348) (0.760) (0.083) (0.185)
EXOSQ -0.001 0.017 0.004 0.020
(0.871) (0.373) (0.580) (0.300)
NEXO 0.0140 0.014 -0.239a -0.237a 0.021 0.021 -0.217a -0.215a
(0.938) (0.937) (0.004) (0.003) (0.891) (0.894) (0.008) (0.006)
INST 0.4683c 0.472b 0.571b 0.5677b 0.361 0.355 0.610c 0.608c
(0.087) (0.093) (0.073) (0.074) (0.126) (0.133) (0.061) (0.061)
NCH 0.0038 0.004 0.0176 0.011 0.003 0.003 0.014 0.007
(0.918) (0.913) (0.743) (0.835) (0.917) (0.924) (0.788) (0.896)
N 144 144 144 144 144 144 144 144
F-Test 5.34a 20.39a 1.97b 1.99b 2.81a 25.72a 2.05b 2.09a
R2 0.25 0.25 0.17 0.17 0.28 0.28 0.17 0.17
All models include a constant and industry dummies. P-values are robust to heteroscedasticity and are reported in parenthesis. Table 1
provides definition for all variables. a, b and c indicate the coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively
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